Please fill in the blanks for those. It’s a single-line statement. It is to make sure everything is understood correctly.
Liberty Analysis Preparation Sheet
Your Name: ________________________________________
What is your controversy? (Name of case) ________________________________________
1A. Which side would most promote independence? ______________________________
1B. Why?__________________________________________________________________
1C. Which primary source quotation in the book will you use to define this meaning? (a quotation that defines this concept, not a description of the case )
__________________________________________________________________________
2A. Which side would most promote federalism? ______________________________
2B. Why?__________________________________________________________________
2C. Which primary source quotation in the book will you use to define this meaning? (a quotation that defines this concept, not a description of the case )
_______________________________________________________________________
3A. Which side would most promote personal responsibility? __________________________
3B. Why?__________________________________________________________________
3C. Which primary source quotation will you use to illustrate this meaning? (a quotation that defines this concept, not a description of the case )
____________________________________________________________________________
4A. Which side would most promote personal liberties?___________________________
4B. Why?__________________________________________________________________
4C. Which primary source quotation will you use to illustrate this meaning? (a quotation that defines this concept, not a description of the case )
_________________________________________________________________________
5A. Which side would most promote living under a constitutionally limited government?________________
5B. Why?__________________________________________________________________
5C. Which two primary source quotations will you use (see directions for which ones)?
_____________________________________________________________
Note: include Activity Number and Letter for primary source quotations (for example 53D).
Scenarios from Actual Supreme Court Cases
1. “Benjamin Gitlow was indicted in the Supreme Court of New York, with three others, for the
statutory crime of criminal anarchy. New York Penal Law, 160, 161.1 He was separately tried,
convicted, and sentenced to imprisonment….The case is here on writ of error to the Supreme
Court, to which the record was remitted. The contention here is that the statute, by its terms and as
applied in this case, is repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (Gitlow
v. People of the State of New York, 1925)
2. “Title II has the caption “Federal Old-Age Benefits.” The benefits are of two types, first,
monthly pensions, and second, lump sum payments…. The scheme of benefits created by the
provisions of Title II is not in contravention of the limitations of the Tenth Amendment….
Congress may spend money in aid of the ‘general welfare.’ Constitution, Art. I, section 8; United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65; Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, supra. There have been great
statesmen in our history who have stood for other views. We will not resurrect the contest. It is
now settled by decision. United States v. Butler, supra. The conception of the spending power
advocated by Hamilton and strongly reinforced by Story has prevailed over that of Madison, which
has not been lacking in adherents…. Nor is the concept of the general welfare static. Needs that
were narrow or parochial a century ago may be interwoven in our day with the wellbeing of the
Nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the times” (U.S. Supreme Court, Helvering v.
Davis, 1937).
3. “It is urged that, under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, Article I, § 8, clause 3,
Congress does not possess the power it has in this instance sought to exercise…. This Act extends
federal regulation to production not intended in any part for commerce, but wholly for
consumption on the farm…. The present Chief Justice has said in summary of the present state of
the law: The commerce power is not confined in its exercise to the regulation of commerce among
the states. It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce … as to make
regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the effective execution
of the granted power to regulate interstate commerce. . .” (U.S. Supreme Court, Wickard v. Filburn,
1942).
4. “Petitioner after jury trial was found guilty of disorderly conduct in violation of a city ordinance
of Chicago and fined. The case grew out of an address he delivered in an auditorium in Chicago
under the auspices of the Christian Veterans of America…. Outside of the auditorium a crowd of
about one thousand persons gathered to protest against the meeting….The crowd outside was
angry and turbulent. Petitioner in his speech condemned the conduct of the crowd outside and
vigorously, if not viciously, criticized various political and racial groups whose activities he
denounced as inimical to the nation’s welfare…. The argument here has been focused on the issue
of whether the content of petitioner’s speech was composed of derisive, fighting words, which
carried it outside the scope of the constitutional guarantees…” (U.S. Supreme Court, Terminiello
v. City of Chicago, 1949).
5. “In each of the cases, minors of the Negro race, through their legal representatives, seek the aid
of the courts in obtaining admission to the public schools of their community on a nonsegregated
basis. In each instance, they had been denied admission to schools attended by white children
under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to race. This segregation was alleged to
deprive the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment” (U.S.
Supreme Court, Brown et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka et al., 1954).
6. “The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by law, 24 Pa. Stat. 15-1516, as amended, Pub. Law
1928 (Supp. 1960) Dec. 17, 1959, requires that “At least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be
read, without comment, at the opening of each public school on each school day. Any child shall
be excused from such Bible reading, or attending such Bible reading, upon the written request of
his parent or guardian.” The Schempp family, husband and wife and two of their three children,
brought suit to enjoin enforcement of the statute, contending that their rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States are, have been, and will continue to be violated
unless this statute be declared unconstitutional as violative of these provisions of the First
Amendment. They sought to enjoin the appellant school district, wherein the Schempp children
attend school, and its officers and the Superintendent of Public Instruction of the Commonwealth
from continuing to conduct such readings and recitation of the Lord’s Prayer in the public schools
of the district pursuant to the statute” (U.S. Supreme Court, School District of Abington Township,
Pennsylvania, et al. v. Schempp et al., 1963).
7. “We conclude that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the opportunity for equal
participation by all voters in the election of state legislators. Diluting the weight of votes because
of place of residence impairs basic constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment just as
much as invidious discriminations based upon factors such as race, Brown v. Board of
Education…. As stated in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, supra … ‘A citizen, a qualified voter, is no more
nor no less so because he lives in the city or on the farm. This is the clear and strong command of
our Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause. This is an essential part of the concept of a government
of laws, and not men. This is at the heart of Lincoln’s vision of ‘government of the people, by the
people, [and] for the people.’ The Equal Protection Clause demands no less than substantially equal
state legislative representation for all citizens, of all places as well as of all races’” (U.S. Supreme
Court, Reynolds v. Sims, 1964).
8. “Appellants, the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, and its
medical director, a licensed physician, were convicted as accessories for giving married persons
information and medical advice on how to prevent conception and, following examination,
prescribing a contraceptive device or material for the wife’s use. A Connecticut statute makes it a
crime for any person to use any drug or article to prevent conception. Appellants claimed that the
accessory statute as applied violated the Fourteenth Amendment.” (U.S. Supreme Court, Griswold
et al. v. Connecticut, 1965)
9. In June 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a Negro woman, and Richard Loving, a
white man, were married in the District of Columbia pursuant to its laws. Shortly after their
marriage, the Lovings returned to Virginia and established their marital abode in Caroline County.
At the October Term, 1958, of the Circuit Court [388 U.S. 1, 3] of Caroline County, a grand jury
issued an indictment charging the Lovings with violating Virginia’s ban on interracial marriages.
On January 6, 1959, the Lovings pleaded guilty to the charge and were sentenced to one year in
jail; however, the trial judge suspended the sentence for a period of 25 years on the condition that
the Lovings leave the State and not return to Virginia together for 25 years….After their
convictions, the Lovings took up residence in the District of Columbia. On November 6, 1963,
they filed a motion in the state trial court to vacate the judgment and set aside the sentence on the
ground that the statutes which they had violated were repugnant to the [the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses of the] Fourteenth Amendment. (Loving v. Virginia, 1967)
10. “Appellee attacks his conviction of violating Massachusetts law for giving a woman a
contraceptive foam at the close of his lecture to students on contraception. That law makes it a
felony for anyone to give away a drug, medicine, instrument, or article for the prevention of
conception except in the case of (1) a registered physician administering or prescribing it for a
married person or (2) an active registered pharmacist furnishing it to a married person presenting
a registered physician’s prescription.” (Eisenstadt, Sheriff, v. Baird, 1972)
11. “A pregnant single woman (Roe) brought a class action challenging the constitutionality of
the Texas criminal abortion laws, which proscribe procuring or attempting an abortion except on
medical advice for the purpose of saving the mother’s life… A three-judge District Court…
declared the abortion statutes void as vague and overbroadly infringing those plaintiffs’ Ninth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights” (U.S. Supreme Court, Roe et al. v. Wade, District Attorney, 1973).
12. “These three consolidated appeals require us to evaluate the progress of the Dallas Independent
School District (DISD) in eliminating the vestiges of the dual educational system formerly
mandated by Texas law…. We hold that the measures taken by the district court in the areas of
student assignment and site selection and school construction to transform the DISD into a unitary
system are inadequate to right the constitutional wrong denounced by the Supreme Court in Brown
v. Board of Education, 1954…. It is imperative that the dual school structure of the DISD be
completely dismantled by the start of the second semester of the 1975-76 academic year” (U.S. 5th
Circuit Court of Appeals, Tasby v. Estes, 1975).
13. “Respondents, Negro and Mexican-American residents of Dallas, Tex., brought this action …
against petitioners, the Mayor and members of the Dallas City Council, alleging that the City
Charter’s at-large system of electing council members unconstitutionally diluted the vote of racial
minorities…. The District Court orally declared that system unconstitutional and then ‘afforded
the city an opportunity as a legislative body for the City of Dallas to prepare a plan which would
be constitutional.’ The City Council then passed a resolution expressing its intention to enact an
ordinance that would provide for eight council members to be elected from single-member districts
and for the three remaining members, including the Mayor, to be elected at large…. The District
Court approved the plan, which the City Council thereafter formally enacted as an ordinance….
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the District Court had erred…. Held. The judgment
is reversed and the case is remanded” (U.S. Supreme Court, Wise v. Lipscomb, 1979).
14. The question presented by these cases is whether, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, Texas may deny to undocumented school-age children the free
public education that it provides to children who are citizens of the United States or legally
admitted aliens. Since the late 19th century, the United States has restricted immigration into this
country. Unsanctioned entry into the United States is a crime…and those who have entered
unlawfully are subject to deportation….But despite the existence of these legal restrictions, a
substantial number of persons have succeeded in unlawfully entering the United States, and now
live within various States, including the State of Texas. In May 1975, the Texas Legislature
revised its education laws to withhold from local school districts any state funds for the education
of children who were not “legally admitted” into the United States. The 1975 revision also
authorized local school districts to deny enrollment in their public schools to children not “legally
admitted” to the country…..This is a class action, filed in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas in September 1977, on behalf of certain school-age children of Mexican
origin residing in Smith County, Tex., who could not establish that they had been legally admitted
into the United States. The action complained of the exclusion of plaintiff children from the public
schools of the Tyler Independent School District.” (Plyler v. Doe, 1982)
15. “During the 1984 Republican National Convention in Dallas, Texas, respondent Johnson
participated in a political demonstration to protest the policies of the Reagan administration and
some Dallas-based corporations. After a march through the city streets, Johnson burned an
American flag while protesters chanted. No one was physically injured or threatened with injury,
although several witnesses were seriously offended by the flag burning. Johnson was convicted of
desecration of a venerated object in violation of a Texas statute, and a State Court of Appeals
affirmed. However, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that the State,
consistent with the First Amendment, could not punish Johnson for burning the flag in these
circumstances.” (Texas v. Johnson, 1989)
16. “At issue are five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982: 3205, which
requires that a woman seeking an abortion give her informed consent prior to the procedure, and
specifies that she be provided with certain information at least 24 hours before the abortion is
performed; 3206, which mandates the informed consent of one parent for a minor to obtain an
abortion, but provides a judicial bypass procedure; 3209, which commands that, unless certain
exceptions apply, a married woman seeking an abortion must sign a statement indicating that she
has notified her husband; 3203, which defines a “medical emergency” that will excuse compliance
with the foregoing requirements; and 3207(b), 3214(a), and 3214(f), which impose certain
reporting requirements on facilities providing abortion services. Before any of the provisions took
effect, the petitioners, five abortion clinics and a physician representing himself and a class of
doctors who provide abortion services, brought this suit seeking a declaratory judgment that each
of the provisions was unconstitutional on its face, as well as injunctive relief. The District Court
held all the provisions unconstitutional, and permanently enjoined their enforcement. The Court
of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, striking down the husband notification provision
but upholding the others….Constitutional protection of the woman’s decision to terminate her
pregnancy derives from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It declares that no
State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” The
controlling word in the cases before us is “liberty.”“ (Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 1992)
17. “This case began in 1985 and initially resulted in a consent decree, which was approved by
the district court in 1987…. The consent decree addressed the plaintiff class’s challenge under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment … to the purposeful racial discrimination
and segregation within DHA’s public housing programs…. Virtually all non-elderly public
housing units were constructed in minority areas of Dallas….
The 1987 consent decree required the demolition of approximately 2,600 units of public housing
in DHA’s West Dallas project, a public housing development located in a predominantly black
area of the city and referred to by this court as ‘one of Dallas’s worst slums.’ These units were to
be replaced on a one-for-one basis with additional public housing units and Section 8 certificates
and vouchers. The decree also required that one hundred newly constructed replacement units be
built in a predominantly white area of Dallas, that a nondiscriminatory tenant selection and
assignment plan be implemented, and that a Section 8 mobility plan be established to assist black
families joining the Section 8 program in finding housing in white areas of Dallas” (The U.S.
District Court’s ruling in Walker v. HUD, 1989, as described by the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of
Appeals in Walker v. HUD, 1999).
18. We apply these principles to a Nebraska law banning “partial birth abortion.” The statute reads
as follows: ”No partial birth abortion shall be performed in this state, unless such procedure is
necessary to save the life of the mother whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, physical
illness, or physical injury, including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or arising
from the pregnancy itself.” Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. §28-328(1) (Supp. 1999)…. Dr. Leroy Carhart
is a Nebraska physician who performs abortions in a clinical setting. He brought this lawsuit in
Federal District Court seeking a declaration that the Nebraska statute violates the Federal
Constitution, and asking for an injunction forbidding its enforcement. After a trial on the merits,
during which both sides presented several expert witnesses, the District Court held the statute
unconstitutional. 11 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (Neb. 1998). On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 192
F. 3d 1142 (1999); cf. Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F. 3d 857 (CA7 1999) (en banc) (considering a
similar statute, but reaching a different legal conclusion). We granted certiorari to consider the
matter (Stenberg v. Carhart, 2000)
19. Prior to 1995, a student elected as Santa Fe High School’s student council chaplain delivered
a prayer over the public address system before each home varsity football game. Respondents,
Mormon and Catholic students or alumni and their mothers, filed a suit challenging this practice
and others under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. While the suit was pending,
petitioner school district (District) adopted a different policy, which authorizes two student
elections, the first to determine whether “invocations” should be delivered at games, and the
second to select the spokesperson to deliver them. After the students held elections authorizing
such prayers and selecting a spokesperson, the District Court entered an order modifying the policy
to permit only nonsectarian, nonproselytizing prayer. The Fifth Circuit held that, even as modified
by the District Court, the football prayer policy was invalid. Held: The District’s policy permitting
student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violates the Establishment Clause. (Santa
Fe Independence School District v. Doe, individually and as next friend for her minor children,
et al., 2000)
20. The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA) expands the federal prohibition on
child pornography to include not only pornographic images made using actual children, 18 U. S. C.
§2256(8)(A), but also “any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or
computer or computer-generated image or picture” that “is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging
in sexually explicit conduct,” §2256(8)(B), and any sexually explicit image that is “advertised,
promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression” it
depicts “a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct,” §2256(8)(D). Thus, §2256(8)(B) bans a
range of sexually explicit images, sometimes called “virtual child pornography,” that appear to
depict minors but were produced by means other than using real children, such as through the use
of youthful-looking adults or computer-imaging technology. Section 2256(8)(D) is aimed at
preventing the production or distribution of pornographic material pandered as child pornography.
Fearing that the CPPA threatened their activities, respondents, an adult-entertainment trade
association and others, filed this suit alleging that the “appears to be” and “conveys the impression”
provisions are overbroad and vague, chilling production of works protected by the First
Amendment” (Ashcroft, Attorney General, et al. v. Free Speech Coalition et al., 2002).
21. “Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence, Houston police entered
petitioner Lawrence’s apartment and saw him and another adult man, petitioner Garner, engaging
in a private, consensual sexual act. Petitioners were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual
intercourse in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage in
certain intimate sexual conduct. In affirming, the State Court of Appeals held, inter alia, that the
statute was not unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
(Lawrence v. Texas, 2003)
22. “After approving an integrated development plan designed to revitalize its ailing economy,
respondent city, through its development agent, purchased most of the property earmarked for the
project from willing sellers, but initiated condemnation proceedings when petitioners, the owners
of the rest of the property, refused to sell. Petitioners brought this state-court action claiming, inter
alia, that the taking of their properties would violate the “public use” restriction in the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause.” (Kelo et al. v. City of New London et al., 2005)
23. “California’s Compassionate Use Act authorizes limited marijuana use for medicinal
purposes. Respondents Raich and Monson are California residents who both use doctor-
recommended marijuana for serious medical conditions. After federal Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) agents seized and destroyed all six of Monson’s cannabis plants,
respondents brought this action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief prohibiting the
enforcement of the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) to the extent it prevents them from
possessing, obtaining, or manufacturing cannabis for their personal medical use. Respondents
claim that enforcing the CSA against them would violate the Commerce Clause and other
constitutional provisions.” (Gonzales, Attorney General, et al. v. Raich et al., 2005)
24. “Among the 21 historical markers and 17 monuments surrounding the Texas State Capitol is
a 6-foot-high monolith inscribed with the Ten Commandments. The legislative record illustrates
that, after accepting the monument from the Fraternal Order of Eagles–a national social, civic, and
patriotic organization–the State selected a site for it based on the recommendation of the state
organization that maintains the capitol grounds. Petitioner, an Austin resident who encounters the
monument during his frequent visits to those grounds, brought this 42 U. S. C. §1983 suit seeking
a declaration that the monument’s placement violates the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause
and an injunction requiring its removal. Holding that the monument did not contravene the Clause,
the District Court found that the State had a valid secular purpose in recognizing and commending
the Eagles for their efforts to reduce juvenile delinquency, and that a reasonable observer, mindful
of history, purpose, and context, would not conclude that this passive monument conveyed the
message that the State endorsed religion. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Held: The judgment is
affirmed” (U.S. Supreme Court, Van Orden v. Perry, in his official capacity as Governor of Texas
and Chairman, State Preservation Board, et al., 2005).
25. “The Oregon Death With Dignity Act (ODWDA) exempts from civil or criminal liability
state-licensed physicians who … dispense or prescribe a lethal dose of drugs upon the request of
a terminally ill patient. In 2001, the Attorney General [of the United States] issued an Interpretive
Rule … declaring that using controlled substances to assist suicide is not a legitimate medical
practice and that dispensing or prescribing them for this purpose is unlawful under the CSA
(Federal Controlled Substances Act).” (Gonzales v. Oregon, January 17, 2006)
26. “New Hampshire’s Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act…prohibits physicians from
performing an abortion on a pregnant minor until 48 hours after written notice of such abortion is
delivered to her parent or guardian. The Act does not require notice for an abortion necessary to
prevent the minor’s death if there is sufficient time to provide notice, and permits a minor to
petition a judge to authorize her physician to perform an abortion without parental notification.
The Act does not explicitly permit a physician to perform an abortion in a medical emergency
without parental notification, Respondents…filed suit…claiming that the Act is unconstitutional
because of the inadequacy of the life exception and the judicial bypass’ confidentiality provision.”
(Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, January 18, 2006)
27. “Pursuant to Congress’ joint resolution authorizing the use of necessary and appropriate force
against nations, organizations, or persons that planned, authorized, committed, or aided in the
September 11, 2001, al Qaeda terrorist attacks, the President sent Armed Forces into Afghanistan
to wage a military campaign against al Qaeda and the Taliban regime that had supported it.
Petitioners, 2 Australians and 12 Kuwaitis captured abroad during the hostilities, are being held in
military custody at the Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Naval Base, which the United States occupies
under a lease and treaty recognizing Cuba’s ultimate sovereignty, but giving this country complete
jurisdiction and control for so long as it does not abandon the leased areas. Petitioners filed suits
under federal law challenging the legality of their detention, alleging that they had never been
combatants against the United States or engaged in terrorist acts, and that they have never been
charged with wrongdoing, permitted to consult counsel, or provided access to courts or other
tribunals.” (Rasul v. Bush, 2004)
28. “Pursuant to Congress’ Joint Resolution authorizing the President to “use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed or aided” the September 11, 2001, al Qaeda terrorist attacks (AUMF), U. S.
Armed Forces invaded Afghanistan. During the hostilities, in 2001, militia forces captured
petitioner Hamdan, a Yemeni national, and turned him over to the U. S. military, which, in 2002,
transported him to prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Over a year later, the President deemed
Hamdan eligible for trial by military commission for then-unspecified crimes. After another year,
he was charged with conspiracy “to commit … offenses triable by military commission.” In habeas
and mandamus petitions, Hamdan asserted that the military commission lacks authority to try him
because (1) neither congressional Act nor the common law of war supports trial by this commission
for conspiracy, an offense that, Hamdan says, is not a violation of the law of war; and (2) the
procedures adopted to try him violate basic tenets of military and international law, including the
principle that a defendant must be permitted to see and hear the evidence against him.” (Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld, 2006)
29. “Petitioners are aliens detained at Guantanamo after being captured in Afghanistan or
elsewhere abroad and designated enemy combatants by [Combatant Status Review Tribunals].
Denying membership in the al Qaeda terrorist network that carried out the September 11 attacks
and the Taliban regime that supported al Qaeda, each petitioner sought a write of habeas corpus in
the District Court, which ordered the cases dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because Guantanamo
is outside sovereign territory. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, but this Court reversed, holding that 28
U.S.C s. 2241 extended statutory habeas jurisdiction to Guanatanamo. See Rasul v. Bush….While
appeals were pending, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, sec. 10005(e) of
which amended 28 U.S.C. sec.2241 to provide that ‘no court, justice, or judge shall have
jurisdiction to…consider…an application for…habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien
detained…at Guantanamo’….The D.C Circuit concluded that…petitioners are not entitled to…the
protections of the Suspension Clause [of the US Constitution]…and that it was therefore
unnecessary to consider whether the DTA provided an adequate and effective substitute for
habeas” (Boumediene v. Bush, 2008).
30. “The City of Farmers Branch, Texas, (“the City”) appeals the district court’s summary
judgment enjoining it from implementing a purported housing ordinance that requires all …
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